ANTITRUST-FEDERAL PREEMPTION-SECTION 1 OF SHERMAN
ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE FIXING

RENTAL RATES-Fisher v. City of Berkeley,

106 S. Ct. 1045

(1986).
The Sherman Antitrust Act' is designed to promote un-

restricted competition 2 and to decentralize economic power.'
Despite this federal legislation, state and local governments often
enact regulations that restrain trade and disrupt the free market
system. 4 For over forty years, 5 the United States Supreme Court
has struggled with the conflict between federal antitrust laws and
anticompetitive state and local regulations. 6 In general, the
Court has permitted states to impose restraints on trade.7 Until
I See Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)). In United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972),
the United States Supreme Court noted that:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And
the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small,
is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion,
and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
Id.
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in pertinent
part that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce or among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits unilateral
and concerted conduct which constitutes monopolization "or [an] attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." Id.; see
also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (discussing congressional intent for enacting section 2 of Sherman Act).
4 See Note, Preemption or Exemption-What is the Proper Test for Home Rule Antitrust
Immunity? Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 819,
819 (1982).
5 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045, 1053 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
6 See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 445 U.S. 40
(1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1980); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See infra notes 7-8, 85-129 and accompanying text for a further explanation of the conflict involved in these cases.
7 See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982) (upholding state
law which allowed liquor distiller to control distribution of products within state);
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (validating state
franchise law requiring automobile manufacturers to acquire permission from state
before opening dealership); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upholding state
sponsored marketing program even though program restricted competition and
fixed prices). But cf. California Retail Liquor DealersAss'n., 445 U.S. at 102 (invalidat-
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recently, however, the Court had been reluctant to extend the
same protection to municipal regulations' unless they were enacted pursuant to an expressed state policy.' In adjudicating the
validity of a municipal ordinance enacted pursuant to state authorization, the Court has traditionally presumed that the ordinance was violative of the Sherman Act without first applying
traditional antitrust analyses.' In Fisher v. City of Berkeley," however, the Court found it unnecessary to address the state authorization question since it concluded that under traditional antitrust
principles a local rent control ordinance was not violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 2
In June 1980, the citizens of Berkeley, California, enacted by
initiative the "Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause
Ordinance"'" (Ordinance) in order to prevent unwarranted rent
increases.14 The Ordinance imposed strict rent controls on all of
ing state statute requiring wine producers to fix prices); Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (holding state's participation in private company's marketing program was insufficient to qualify for state action exemption).
8 See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985) (holding
municipality entitled to state action protection from antitrust laws only if local regulation was enacted pursuant to expressed state policy); Community Communications
Co., 455 U.S. at 48 (invalidating local ordinance since essential state authorization
was lacking); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (holding municipal ordinances valid
under antitrust laws provided they are enacted pursuant to state authorization and
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy").
9 See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410. The state policy must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed... " Id.
10 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644,661, 693 P.2d 261, 276, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 682, 697 (1984), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986) (citing Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)). In analyzing alleged antitrust violations, the Court has traditionally applied a per se or rule of reason analysis. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
75 YALE L. J. 775, 775 (1965). A per se analysis is applicable where the Court
establishes that an agreement fixes prices "and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). Most other restraints of trade are analyzed under the
rule of reason standard which "requires the factfinder to decide whether under all
the circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition." Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
343 (1982).
"1 106 S.Ct. 1045 (1986).
12 See id. at 1051.
13 See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693 P.2d at 269, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
14 See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Program
13.76.030 (1980) [hereinafter Ordinance]. The stated purpose of the Ordinance is:
to regulate residential rent increases in the city of Berkeley and to protect tenants from unwarranted rent increases and arbitrary, discriminatory, or retaliatory evictions, in order to help maintain the diversity of
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the city's residential units 5 and established a rent ceiling 6 which
landlords could not exceed unless they acted pursuant to an annual rate increase prescribed by the Rent Stabilization Board or
they successfully petitioned the Board for an individual

adjustment. 17
Shortly thereafter, a group of landlords instituted an action
in the Superior Court of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Ordinance.' 8 The landlords claimed that the Ordinance violated their fourteenth
amendment due process and equal protection rights. 9 The trial
court granted the city a judgment on20the pleadings and held that
the Ordinance was valid on its face.
The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and
held that the Ordinance was unconstitutional because procedural
delays in rent adjustments deprived landlords of their right to
due process of law. 2 ' While the case was pending appeal to the
the Berkeley community and to ensure compliance with legal obligations relating to the rental of housing. This legislation is designed to
address the City of Berkeley's housing crisis, preserve the public peace,
health and safety, and advance the housing policies of the city with regard to low and fixed income persons, minorities, students, handicapped, and the aged.
Id.
15 See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1047. Section 5 of the Ordinance exempts "government owned units, transient units, cooperatives, hospitals, certain small owner-occupied buildings, and all newly constructed buildings" from the city-imposed rent
controls. Id. (citing Ordinance, supra note 14).
16 Id. The Ordinance defines "rent ceiling" as "the maximum allowable rent
which a landlord may charge on any rental unit covered" under the Ordinance.
Ordinance, supra note 14, at 13.76.040(m).
17 Ordinance, supra note 14, at 13.76.120. Section 6 of the Ordinance establishes a rent stabilization board consisting of nine commissioners. Id. at 13.76.060.
This section also sets out the powers, duties, procedures, and rules, in addition to a
means of terminating rent control, if Berkeley's vacancy rate exceeds five percent.
Id. Under section 11 of the Ordinance, the Board can make annual general adjustments to cover any increases or decreases in utilities and taxes. Id. at 13.76.110.
Landlords not satisfied with general increases may petition the Board for individual
adjustments pursuant to section 12. Id. at 13.76.120.
18 Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 653, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
19 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1047.
20 Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 653, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
21 Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 148 Cal. App. 3d 267, 195 Cal. Rptr. 836, 837
(1983), vacated, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984), aff'd on
other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). While this action was pending before the
court of appeals, the citizens of Berkeley passed the "Tenants' Rights Amendments
Act of 1982," which revised specific sections of the 1980 Rent Control Ordinance.
Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1047 n.1. The California Court of Appeals, the California
Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court reviewed the Ordinance as
amended. Id.
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California Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court de22
cided the case of Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.
In that case, the Court held that an ordinance enacted by a home
rule municipality was subject to federal antitrust scrutiny. 3
Thereafter, certain amici curiae24 raised the issue of the effect of
Boulder, and of antitrust laws in general, on the Berkeley
Ordinance. 5
The California Supreme Court considered the validity of the
rent control Ordinance under the Sherman Act even though the
lower courts had not addressed the issue.2 6 The court initially
noted that the Ordinance would be scrutinized under the standard articulated in Boulder only if found to conflict with, and thus
be preempted by, the federal antitrust laws.2 7 In determining
whether the Ordinance was in fact preempted, the court developed its own criteria instead of applying traditional antitrust
standards.2 8 Concluding that the Ordinance did not conflict with
either section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act,2 9 the court did not address the issues raised in Boulder.30 Accordingly, the court held
that the Ordinance was valid on its face. 3 '
22 455 U.S. 40 (1982); see infra notes 112-29 and accompanying text (discussion
of City of Boulder).
23 See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 48-57.
24 See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1047.
25 Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 654, 693 P.2d at 270-71, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
26 Id. The California Supreme Court relied on California case law in justifying
its authority to consider the antitrust issue on appeal. Id. at 654 n.3, 693 P.2d at
271 n.3, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 692 n.3. The court noted the following: (1) a new legal
issue was decided while the Fisher case was pending appeal; (2) the case was on
appeal from an action seeking injunctive relief; and (3) the new issue raised was a
question of law and involved public policy matters. See id.
27 Id. at 660, 693 P.2d at 275, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
28 Id. at 667-77, 693 P.2d at 280-88, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 700-09. The California
Supreme Court developed a four part test based on the United States Supreme
Court's commerce clause cases. Id. Under this test, the Ordinance would be preempted only if it did not have a proper local purpose; it was not rationally related to
the municipality's police powers; it was discriminatory; and its purpose could be
achieved through less intrusive means. Id. at 674-77, 693 P.2d at 286-88, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 706-09. The court refused to apply the per se rule of illegality because the
two principle justifications of this standard, economic reliability and ease of administration, did apply to the case at bar. Id. at 667, 693 P.2d at 281, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
702.
29 Id. at 652, 693 P.2d at 269, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
30 Id.
31 Id. Specifically, the court held that the Ordinance did not conflict with the
federal antitrust laws. Id. The court also concluded that the Ordinance was constitutional, on its face, with regard to the state and federal due process challenges. Id.
The court also determined, however, that the provision of the Ordinance creating
an evidentiary presumption as to the burden of proof regarding retaliatory evic-
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court limited its jurisdiction to the antitrust preemption question.32 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's
decision on different grounds. 3 Applying traditional antitrust
standards, the Court held that the Berkeley Ordinance was not
preempted by section 1 of the Sherman Act and was thus valid.3 4
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits all entities from contracting, conspiring, or combining to unreasonably restrain
trade. 35 The United States Supreme Court has not extended section 1 to invalidate unilateral or independent conduct irrespective of any anticompetitive purpose or effect that such conduct
may have.36
As early as 1919, in United States v. Colgate & Co. ,37 the United
States Supreme Court determined that the Sherman Act permits
independent activity provided there is no intent to monopolize.3 8
In Colgate, the federal government contended that a manufacturer of soap and related products conspired with wholesalers
and retailers to fix prices. 39 Scrutinizing the manufacturer's actions, the Court concluded that Colgate specified resale prices
and refused to deal with wholesalers and retailers who failed to
comply with Colgate's pricing practice. 4 In the Court's view,
however, Colgate acted independently. 4 Therefore, its conduct
tions was invalid. Id. Since the evidentiary provision was severable, the court concluded that the remainder of the Ordinance was legal. Id.
32 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1048.
33 Id. Rather than relying on the four part standard developed by the California
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court applied a traditional antitrust
analysis. Id.
34 Id. at 1051.
35 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
36 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1049.
37 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
38 Id. at 307. The Court specifically held that "[t]he purpose of the... Act is to
prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which probably would unduly interfere with the free exercise of... trade and commerce-in a word to preserve the
right of freedom to trade." Id.
39 Id. at 302. The United States government indicted Colgate because it:
knowingly and unlawfully created and engaged in a combination with
... [its wholesalers and retailers] ... for the purpose and with the effect
of procuring adherence on the part of such dealers . . . to resale prices
fixed by [Colgate], and of preventing such dealers from reselling such
products at lower prices, thus suppressing competition ... in violation
of the [Sherman Act].
Id. at 302-03.
40

Id. at 306.

41

See id.
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was not prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 2 The Court
further reasoned that an opposite result would interfere with a
manufacturer's right to do business with whomever it pleased.43
44
In the 1984 case of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,
the United States Supreme Court reiterated its position that section45 1 of the Sherman Act applies exclusively to concerted activity.
In Monsanto, a manufacturer of agricultural herbicides
refused to renew a distributorship agreement with the Spray-Rite
Service Corporation (Spray-Rite).46 Spray-Rite instituted suit alleging that the manufacturer and other distributors conspired to
maintain resale prices and to terminate Spray-Rite's distributorship. 4 7 The trial court determined that the manufacturer conspired with several of its distributors in violation of section 1.48
After reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, the Court held
that there was sufficient evidence to support the lower court's
49
holding.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court articulated
the standard of proof antitrust plaintiffs must meet in order to
successfully challenge a price fixing conspiracy. 50 Under Monsanto, antitrust plaintiffs must establish the existence of an agreement through either direct or circumstantial evidence. 5 '
Applying this standard, the Court reasoned that the mere fact
that the manufacturer received complaints regarding SprayRite's price cutting practice from several of its distributors did
not support an inference of an agreement or conspiracy. 52 The
Court observed that Spray-Rite had to produce additional evidence clearly illustrating conduct which could not possibly have
been an independent act. 53 Moreover, Spray-Rite had to demonstrate that the manufacturer and its distributors intentionally ac42 See id.
43 Id. at 307. Relying on prior decisions, the Court observed that a manufacturer is free to "announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse
to sell." Id. The Court also noted that a retailer has the right to refuse to deal with
a manufacturer who the retailer feels is acting unfairly. Id. (citing Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914)).
44 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
45 Id. at 761.
46 Id. at 757.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 757-58.
49 Id. at 768.
50 Id. at 763.
51 Id. at 764.
52 Id. at 763.
53 Id. at 764.
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ted pursuant to a common scheme with some unlawful
purpose. 54 Spray-Rite met this burden of proof, thereby establishing that the manufacturer's termination of Spray-Rite's distributorship was an illegal conspiracy.- 5
Three months later in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube

Corp.,56 the United States Supreme Court held that a price fixing
agreement between a parent corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary did not constitute concerted action under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 57 The Court began its analysis by refuting the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,58 which was based on the
principle that the parent-subsidiary relationship did not shield an
entity from section 1 liability.59 The Court stated that the doctrine erroneously treated agreements between a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary as concerted conduct. 6' Although a
subsidiary is separately incorporated from its parent company,
the Court reasoned that coordinated activity between such entities was analogous to agreements made between members of a
single firm or between a corporation and its unincorporated departments. 6 ' In the Copperweld Court's view, coordinating activities between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary were
unilateral since the two corporations were effectively a single enterprise acting with a common purpose. 6 2 Accordingly, the Copperweld Court concluded that a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary are not separate entities and, therefore, could not conspire in violation of section 1.63
In dealing with conflicts between federal antitrust laws and
state and local regulations, the United States Supreme Court has
developed the state action doctrine in lieu of a traditional anti54

Id.

55
56

Id. at 768.
467 U.S. 752 (1984).

57 Id. at 777. See Note, Parent Corporationand Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary Incapable
of Conspiring in Violation of Section One of Sherman Act, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 943
(1985).
58 See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 759-73. The Copperweld Court stated that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine "provides that § 1 liability is not foreclosed merely
because a parent and its subsidiary are subject to common ownership." Id. at 759.
The Court then proceeded to set forth the development of this doctrine by analyzing several of the Supreme Court's earlier opinions. See id. at 759-66.
59 Id. at 759.
60 Id. at 777. The Court expressly overruled the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine as it applied to wholly owned subsidiaries. Id.
61 See id. at 766, 769, 770.
62 Id. at 771.
63 See id.

362

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:355

trust analysis. 64 The leading case espousing this doctrine is the
1943 decision of Parkerv. Brown 6 5 which was predicated upon the
federalism precept that states are sovereign under the federal
Constitution.6 6
In Parker, a California raisin producer instituted an action to
enjoin the enforcement of a state sponsored marketing program
which restricted competition and fixed prices. 67 The producer
alleged that the state and public officials responsible for the administration of the program were thereby violating the Sherman
Act.6 8 The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by
observing that if private individuals or corporations had implemented a similar marketing program, their conduct would have
been illegal under the antitrust laws. 69 Since the Parker program
was authorized and administered by the state, the Court held that
the activities of the state and its agents were not subject to antitrust scrutiny. 70 Moreover, the Court noted a lack of express
congressional intent to restrain states from enacting economic
regulations in their sovereign capacity. 7 1 In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the United States Constitution which
provides for a federal system of government in which the states
are sovereign and where only Congress can expressly limit the
authority of the states.7 2 In dicta, the Court further noted that a
state could not extend this antitrust immunity to private citizens
through its legislation.7 3
Eight years later, in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers
Corp. ,74 the United States Supreme Court was once again confronted with the issue of whether a state regulation conflicted
with the Sherman Act. 7 5 In that case, the Court refused to upSee Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
Id. Although Parker is the case most frequently cited as the starting point for
cases dealing with conflicts between the Sherman Act and anticompetitive regulations, the state action doctrine actually originated in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332
(1904). See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 615-16 n.3 (1976) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
66 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53
(1982).
67 Parker, 317 U.S. at 344, 346.
68 See id. at 344.
69 Id. at 350. While the Court made this statement, it failed to explain why such
conduct on the part of private parties would have been illegal. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 351.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
75 Id.
64
65
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hold a Louisiana statute which authorized individuals to enforce
price fixing contracts against parties, as well as nonparties, to
such agreements.7 6 In Schwegmann, a group of liquor distributors
contracted with their retailers to establish minimum prices.77 A
New Orleans retailer refused to sign the agreement and proceeded to sell the distributors' products at reduced prices.78
Thereafter, the distributors sued to enjoin the retailer from engaging in allegedly unlawful price cutting activities.79
Although the Schwegmann Court did not apply the Parker state
action analysis, it relied on the dicta articulated by the Parker
Court to invalidate the statute on the grounds that it compelled
all retailers to abandon price competition.8" Consequently, the
Schwegmann Court reasoned that such conduct constituted horizontal price fixing which is prohibited by the Sherman Act. 8 '
The Court also rejected the distributors' contention that the statute was protected from the antitrust laws under the Miller-Tydings Act. 82 While the Miller-Tydings Act granted limited
antitrust immunity to certain state authorized retail price maintenance agreements, the Court explained that the Act did not sanction the statute's nonsigner provision.83 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court refused to enjoin the nonconsenting retailer
Id. at 387.
77 Id. at 385.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 385-86.
80 Id. at 389.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 386-87. The Miller-Tydings Act was "enacted in 1937 as an amendment
to § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 386. It provided in pertinent part that " 'nothing
herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
prices for the resale' of specified commodities when 'contracts or agreements of that
description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions' under local law." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Miller-Tydings Act, 1937, ch. 690, title VIII, 50 Stat.
693, repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat.
801 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). The Miller-Tydings Act was
later repealed in 1975 by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act. See California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980).
83 See Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 388-89. After reviewing the Miller-Tydings Act's
legislative history, the Court stated the following:
What is granted is a limited immunity-a limitation that is further emphasized by the inclusion in the state law and the exclusion from the
federal law of the nonsigner provision. The omission of the nonsigner
provision from the federal law is fatal to respondents' position unless we
are to perform a distinct legislative function by reading into the Act a
provision that was meticulously omitted from it.
Id. at 388.
76
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from selling the distributors' products below the fixed prices.8 4
Similarly, in CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc. ,85 the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
which permitted private parties to fix prices.8 6 The statute required all wine producers to file price schedules with the state
and all wholesalers to sell wine at fixed prices.8 7 The Court initially observed that the state's wine pricing system allowed producers to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by the wholesalers8 8 and summarily noted that such activities constituted retail price maintenance, a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. 89 Since the statute conflicted with the antitrust
laws, the Court next considered whether the state's involvement
in the wine pricing scheme was sufficient to qualify for an exemption under the Parker state action doctrine. °0 After reviewing its
prior decisions, the Court articulated the standards required for
antitrust immunity. 9 ' First, the challenged restraint has to be implemented pursuant to a " 'clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed ... state policy,' " and second, the restraint has to be
actively supervised by the state.9 2 Although the California wine
84
85
86
87

See id. at 395.
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
See id. at 99, 102.

Id. at 99.

88 Id. at 103. The Court noted that "such vertical control destroys horizontal
competition as effectively as if wholesalers 'formed a combination and endeavored
to establish the same restrictions ... by agreement with each other.' " Id. (quoting
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911)).
89 See id. at 102-03. The Court observed that it had consistently held that resale
price maintenance agreements are illegal restraints of trade. Id.
90 Id. at 103.
91 See id. at 103-05. The Court relied on four recent decisions dealing with the
state action doctrine in articulating its two-prong test. Id. See also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (holding state statutory scheme
restricting competition in sale of new automobiles exempt from antitrust scrutiny
because program supervised by state); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (holding state supreme court ban on lawyer advertising constituted state
involvement qualifying for Parker exemption); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976) (holding mere state approval of anticompetitive activity insufficient
to establish state action exemption); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975) (denying Parker protection because enforcement of minimum fee schedules
for lawyers by state bar association did not constitute act of state as sovereign).
92 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (Brennan, J., plurality)). Relying on Lafayette, the
Court established a two-prong test for private parties seeking immunity under the
Parkerstate action doctrine. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. Although Midcal was originally a mandamus action seeking an injunction against a state agency, the state had
no involvement in setting prices. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S.
Ct. 1713, 1717 n.3 (1985). This illegal activity was carried out by private wine deal-
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pricing system satisfied the first requirement, the Court found
that it lacked the necessary state supervision.93 Accordingly, the
pricing system was not entitled to protection from the antitrust
laws under the Parker state action doctrine. 94 In dicta, the Court
noted that if the state had established the prices, reviewed the
reasonableness of the price schedules, or monitored market conditions, the challenged pricing scheme would have been exempt
from antitrust scrutiny.95
In contrast to Schwegmann and Midcal, both of which involved
state statutes authorizing private market restraints, the 1978 case
of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. ,96 addressed the

conditions under which local governments may gain Parker protection.9 In Lafayette, the Louisiana Power & Light Co. (L.P.&
L.) sued two municipalities that owned and operated their own
electric utility systems. 98 L.P.& L. alleged that the municipalities
had violated the antitrust laws by engaging in illegal tying arrangements 99 with their customers; that is, the municipalities required customers to purchase electricity from them as a
condition of continuing to supply other utility services. 00° The
municipalities defended their actions on the grounds that they
ers; therefore, the Midcal Court framed its holding in terms of a private party seeking Parker immunity. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
93 AMidcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06. The Court stated that "[t]he State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private parties." Id. at
105. In the Court's view, this was insufficient to entitle a private party to antitrust
immunity. See id. at 105-06.
94 See id. at 106.
95 Id. at 105-06.
96 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The Lafayette Court's decision was rendered in two
phases. See id. at 394. The first issue pertaining to the Court's refusal to find congressional intent to exempt local governments from antitrust liability was a majority
opinion. See id. at 408. As to a local government's protection under the Parker
doctrine, only a plurality of the Court agreed that state government subdivisions
were not exempt simply because of their governmental status. See id. at 413.
97 Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 658, 693 P.2d at 274, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 694-95.
98 Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 392 n.6. This action was initially instituted by municipalities who claimed that the Louisiana Power & Light Co. (L.P.&L.) engaged in anticompetitive activities. Id. at 391-92. L.P.&L. counterclaimed alleging, inter alia,
that the municipalities required their customers to purchase electricity from them
as a condition for continuing to supply water and gas services. Id. at 392 n.6. The
Court's opinion addressed only the issues raised by the L.P.&L. on the counterclaim. See id. at 392.
99 In Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court defined a tying arrangment as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only
on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product, or at
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." Id. at
5-6.
100 Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 391-92 n.6.
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were exempt from the antitrust laws under the Parker doctrine.''
The Lafayette majority refused to infer that Congress intended to exempt cities from antitrust liability. 102 The Court also
rejected the municipalities' claim that the purpose of the antitrust
laws is to protect the public only from the abuses of private businesses and not from the acts of local governments which exist to
serve the welfare of the public. 0 3 Moreover, the majority observed that the municipalities' motive was not solely for the public benefit. 10 4 Instead, like every business entity, the
municipalities may have acted in furtherance of their own selfinterest without regard to the economic impact on surrounding
communities. 1 0 5

Accordingly, the Court recognized that the

challenged tying arrangements adversely affected utility customers in the same manner as similar agreements initiated by private
enterprises. 106
The next part of the Lafayette decision was a plurality opinion
written by Justice Brennan who rejected the municipalities' argument that all governmental entities, including state agencies and
cities, were exempt from the antitrust laws simply because of
their governmental status.'0 7 After evaluating the Supreme
Court's prior decisions, the plurality concluded that the Parker
exemption was available only if the restraint of trade was an act
of government performed by a state in its sovereign capacity or
by its subdivisions acting pursuant to state policy.' 0 8 The plurality based its conclusion on the fact that the municipalities were
not sovereign entities and therefore were not entitled to the same
federal deference as a state.'0 9 Without deciding the issue, Justice Brennan suggested that a city may come within the purview
of the Parker doctrine if it acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed .

.

. state policy" which was actively

supervised by the state itself."0 Refusing to grant automatic im101 Id. at 392.
102
103
104
105
106

See id. at 408.
Id. at 403.

Id.

Id. at 404.
Id. The Court noted that the municipalities could charge discriminating rates
to customers outside of their jurisdiction. Id.
107 Id. at 408.
108 Id. at 413.
109 Id. at 412. The dissent, however, relied on Parkerand maintained that the city
of Lafayette was entitled to state action protection because it was a governmental
body, not a private person, and its action was, therefore, an act of government. Id.
at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I10 Id. at 410. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger viewed the owner-
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munity, the plurality remanded the case for a determination
whether the municipalities acted in furtherance of an expressed
state policy."'
Four years later, in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder," 2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to a narrow interpretation of the Parker doctrine as it applies to local governments." 3 In Boulder, the defendant city, a home rule
municipality, was given the authority to govern its own local affairs.'"' Acting in its regulatory capacity, the city enacted an
emergency ordinance prohibiting the plaintiff corporation from
1 15
expanding its cable television operation for three months. '
During that time, the city council was to draft a model cable tele116
vision ordinance which would increase competition in the city.
The corporation sued to enjoin the enforcement of the moratorium, alleging that it restrained trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 17' The city argued that the ordinance was protected from the antitrust laws under the Parker state action doctrine. 1 8 In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that the city's actions were immune
from liability under the Sherman Act." 9 The Tenth Circuit disship of the utility companies as a proprietary function. See id. at 422 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Accordingly, the Chief Justice would insist on more stringent standards than those articulated by the plurality before granting the municipalities immunity from the Sherman Act. Id. at 425 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In lieu of
the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" standard, the Chief
Justice would require the cities to prove that their conduct was compelled by the State
and was essential to a state plan. Id. (emphasis in original).
' I' See id. at 393-94.
112 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
113 See id. at 52.
114 Id. at 43. The city of Boulder was granted local autonomy pursuant to the
Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado State Constitution. Id. The Colorado
Home Rule Amendment, CoLo. CONST. art. xx, § 6, provides in pertinent part:
The people of each city or town of this state .. are hereby vested
with, and they shall always have, power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law and
extend to all its local and municipal matters.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people
of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of selfgovernment in both local and municipal matters.
Id. at 43-44.
115 City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 45-46.
116 Id. at 46.
117 Id. at 46-47.
I1s Id. at 47.

119 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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tinguished the case at bar from Lafayette by noting that the city of
Boulder had no proprietary interest in the cable television
120
business.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's holding. 21 Reluctant to extend the Parker protection, the
Court held that an ordinance could not be immune from antitrust
liability unless it constituted sovereign state action or municipal
action "in furtherance ... of [a] clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.' 2 2 The Court rejected the city's
contention that the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado
Constitution 12 3 rendered the ordinance a governmental action
performed by the city serving as representative for the state in
local matters. 124 The Boulder Court then proceeded to apply the
two-prong test suggested by the Lafayette plurality. 1 25 The Court
focused on the city's argument that its home rule status satisfied
the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy"
requirement set forth in Lafayette. 12 6 In examining the Home
Rule Amendment, the Court noted that by granting the city general autonomy, the state took a neutral position with regard to
local matters, including the cable television business. 1 2 7 The
Court concluded that neutrality alone was insufficient to satisfy
the first part of the Lafayette test. 128 Consequently, it was unnecessary for the Boulder Court to consider whether the city had to
act under the guidance of the state.' 2 9
After the Boulder and Lafayette decisions, municipalities became the targets of increased antitrust litigation and, consequently, treble damage liability. 130 In response to lobbying
efforts by local governments, Congress enacted the Local GovId. at 708.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 48.
122 Id. at 52 (relying on California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439
U.S. 96 (1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978)).
123 See supra note 114 and accompanying text for pertinent provisions of Colorado Home Rule Amendment.
124 City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53.
125 Id. at 54-56. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text for two-prong test
suggested in Lafayette.
126 City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 51 n. 14. The Court expressly declined to address the application of the
active state supervision criterion articulated in Lafayette. Id.
130 See Mayo, The Local Government Antitrust Act: A Comment On the Constitutional
Questions, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 805, 807 (1985). Over a span of three years the
120
121
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ernment Antitrust Act of 198431 which prohibits the recovery of
damages against a municipality or its agents acting in their official capacity. 1 32 Under the Act,33however, injunctive relief is still
available to antitrust plaintiffs. 1
Although Boulder and Lafayette noted limitations to the state
action doctrine, the United States Supreme Court never definitively explained how precisely a state policy must be articulated
or whether the second prong of the Lafayette standard applies to a
municipality. 1 34 In the 1985 decision of Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire,'3 5 the Supreme Court clarified these ambiguities. 3 6
In Town of Hallie, the city refused to supply sewage treatment to
unincorporated townships but supplied such services to individual landowners living within the townships.' 3 7 The townships alleged that the city engaged in illegal tying arrangements with its
customers and had acquired a monopoly over the sewage treatment services.'13 The city defended its actions under the state
39
action doctrine. 1
In addressing what constituted adequate state policy under
the Lafayette standard, the Supreme Court held that a state statute
need not expressly declare that the legislature intended the delegated action to have an anticompetitive effect.' 4 ° By granting a
municipality broad authority to regulate a specific local concern,
the Court noted that a state could anticipate that anticompetitive
restraints would be enacted.' 4 ' The Court, therefore, rejected
the contention that a municipality had to be compelled by the
number of antitrust suits pending against local governments increased from 43 in
1981, to over 200 in 1983. Id.
131 Id. See also Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-544, § 2, 98
Stat. 2750 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 35 (1982 & Supp. 1986) which states that "[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A,
or 4C of the Clayton Act . . . from any local government, or official or employee
thereof acting in an official capacity." Id.
133 H. R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4603.
134 See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1717 (1985).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1717.
137 Id. at 1715.
138 Id. at 1716.
139 See id. at 1715-16.
140 See id. at 1718.
141 Id. at 1717-18. The Court reviewed several of the provisions of the Wisconsin
statute and noted that Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.18(1) granted "authority to cities to
construct, add to, alter, and repair sewage systems." Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at
1717-18.
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state to act in order to qualify for Parker protection. 1 2 The
Court next inquired as to whether the Lafayette active state supervision requirement applied to municipalities. 1 3 After noting the
ambiguity in its prior decisions with regard to this issue, the
Court observed that the purpose of the supervision criterion was
to assure that the actor was engaged in conduct which would further state policy. 14 4 When the actor is a municipality, as opposed
to a private party, however, the Court found little or no danger of
a local government acting contrary to the interests of the state. 145
Accordingly, the Court concluded that it is unnecessary to require a state to actively supervise a city's execution of a properly
delegated function. 146
Although the United States Supreme Court had clearly established the parameters of the state action doctrine, it never
clearly explained the applicability of the doctrine until Rice v.
Norman Williams Co. 147 In Rice, the Court declared that the Parker
state action doctrine would be applied only after it was established that the challenged state regulation irreconcilably conflicted with, and thus was preempted by, the federal antitrust

laws. 148
Rice involved a 1982 challenge to a California law which allowed liquor distillers to control the distribution of their prod142 Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1720. The townships relied on Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975), to support their "compulsion" argument. Id. See supra note 91 and accompanying text for explanation of these cases. Distinguishing these cases, the Town of
Hallie Court noted that they involved private parties claiming Parker protection.
Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1720. The Court observed that a municipality "is an
arm of the State" and as such it acts for the benefit of the public. Id. The Court
then stated that none of its decisions concerning municipal immunity from the antitrust laws required that the municipality be compelled by the state to act. Id. (citing
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978)). See supra notes 96129 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
14" See Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1720.
144

Id.

145 Id. at 1720-21. The Court noted that "[t]he only real danger is that [the mu-

nicipality] will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of
more overriding state goals. This danger is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy."
Id. at 1721. Since the Court already determined that the city acted pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy, it found it unnecessary to require state supervision.
Id.
146

Id.

654 (1982).
Id. at 659.

147 458 U.S.
148
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ucts within the state.' 49 The Court unanimously held that the
statute, considered in the abstract, did not conflict with the Sherman Act since it did not authorize conduct which is a per se violation. 150 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon
principles similar to those applied when the Court analyzes statutes under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution.15
Initially, the Rice Court observed that the California statute
was not automatically preempted by the Sherman Act simply because it may have an anticompetitive effect.' 5 2 In order to establish preemption, the Court stated that an antitrust plaintiff must
prove that the challenged statute mandated or authorized con53
duct which constituted an illegal act under the antitrust laws.'
In the alternative, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the statute
placed irresistible pressure upon a nonpublic entity to violate the
Sherman Act in complying with the statute.' 5 4 The Court further
explained that the statute would be preempted only if it required
conduct that was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 1 55 Moreover, the Court examined the actions of distillers under the California statute and characterized them as a vertical nonprice
restraint. 15 6 Since this restraint was not per se illegal, the Court
149 Id. at 656. The California Business and Professional Code Annotated provided that a " 'licensed importer shall not purchase or accept delivery of any brand
of distilled spirits unless he is designated as an authorized importer of such brand
by the brand owner or his authorized agent.' " Rice, 458 U.S. at 656-57 (quoting
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23672 (West Supp. 1982)).
150 See Rice, 458 U.S. at 658.
151 Id. at 659. The Court applied principles analogous to those used when determining whether a state regulation is preempted by federal law pursuant to the
supremacy clause; that is, the Court inquired as to whether an "irreconcilable conflict [exists] between the federal and state regulatory schemes." Id. If there is a
conflict between the state regulation and the federal act, then, under the principles
of the supremacy clause, the federal law prevails. See id. The Rice Court further
noted, however, that "[a] state statute is not pre-empted by the federal antitrust
laws simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect. A party
may successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only if the statute on its
face irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy." Id. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
152 See id.
153 Id. at 661.
154 Id.
155 Id. The Court refused to analyze the nonprice restraint under the rule of
reason standard. Id. Such an analysis, the Court reasoned, would require an evaluation of the economic circumstances, an impossible task when reviewing a statute in
the abstract. Id.
156 See id. at 661-62. A vertical nonprice restraint can be defined as follows: an
agreement made between a supplier and dealer or a buyer and seller with the purpose and effect of restraining trade without fixing prices. See Continental T.V., Inc.
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concluded that the statute did not irreconcilably conflict with the
Sherman Act. 15 7 It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to
consider the
validity of the statute under the Parker state action
8
doctrine. 15

The preemption doctrine adopted in Rice is predicated upon
the principle that federal laws are superior to conflicting state
laws.' 51 In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,16 the United States Supreme
Court applied the same theory in analyzing a municipal rent control ordinance. 6 ' After utilizing traditional antitrust standards,
the Court determined that the Berkeley Ordinance did not conflict with the Sherman Act and therefore was not preempted by
the federal antitrust laws.' 62 The Court also concluded that the
absence of preemption rendered it unnecessary to consider
whether the Ordinance was exempt from the antitrust laws under
63
the Parker state action doctrine.
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall focused his opinion on the alleged conflict between the Berkeley rent control Ordinance and section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 64 The Court began
its analysis by observing that a regulation was not preempted
solely because it had an anticompetitive effect. 165 Relying on the
standard articulated in Rice, the Fisher Court reasoned that it was
justified in expanding this rule to the Berkeley Ordinance since
neither the Rice rule nor any other preemption case distinguished
166
between state and local governments.
Based upon the Rice standard, the Supreme Court then mev. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In analyzing the conduct authorized by
the California statute, the Rice Court stated that the statute "merely enforces the
distillers' decisions to restrain intrabrand competition." Rice, 458 U.S. at 661. It
permits the distiller to designate which wholesalers may import the distillers' products into the State. Id.
157 Rice, 458 U.S. at 661-62.
158 Id. at 662 n.9. Although the Court found that the California statute was not
preempted by the Sherman Act, it noted that the distillers' conduct pursuant to the
statute was subject to an antitrust analysis under the rule of reason. Id. at 662.
159 See id. at 659.
160 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
161 See id. at 1048-49.
162 See id. at 1048.
163 Id. at 1051.
164 See id. at 1049.
165 See id. at 1048 (relying on Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659
(1982); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978)).
166 Id. Justice Marshall relied on White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983), for the proposition that preemption analyses in
areas other than antitrust do not distinguish between state and local authorities. See
Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1048.
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ticulously analyzed the landlords' conduct under the Ordinance. 167 In doing so, the Court first addressed the landlords'
contention that the Ordinance violated the Sherman Act because
it imposed rent ceilings which amounted to illegal price fixing.' 68
The majority assumed that if the landlords had privately arranged to stabilize rent rates, their conduct would have consti69
tuted price fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman Act.'
Justice Marshall conceded that the Ordinance had the same adverse economic effect on the housing market as the hypothetical
private conspiracy. 170 In distinguishing the Ordinance from a
private arrangement, however, the Court observed that the city
of Berkeley unilaterally imposed the rent ceilings upon the
landlords.171

In the Court's view, the distinction between unilateral and
concerted action was critical. 172 The Court was greatly influenced by its prior antitrust decisions which required concerted
action between separate entities as a condition precedent for establishing illegal price fixing. 173 Justice Marshall emphasized that
section 1 of the Sherman Act was aimed only at concerted activity
which unreasonably restrained trade by contract, combination, or
conspiracy. 174 The Court further explained that even where a
single entity's conduct has the same anticompetitive effect as concerted action, there is no section 1 violation.' 75 Accordingly, the
Court proceeded to scrutinize the Berkeley Ordinance in order
1 76
to determine whether the required concerted activity existed.
After examining the Ordinance, the Fisher Court concluded
that it constituted neither an agreement between the city and the
Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1049.
Id.
Id. The landlords noted that price fixing has been a per se violation "since
the earliest days of the Sherman Act." Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See id.
173 See id. The Court relied on two of its most recent decisions in requiring a
showing of concerted action in order to maintain a section 1 claim: Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (holding parent and
wholly owned subsidiary are not separate entities and cannot conspire to fix prices)
and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984) (noting that
independent activity must be distinguished from concerted action when analyzing
price fixing practices). See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text for a more
complete discussion of these cases.
174 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1049 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768).
175 Id. (relying on Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 760-61; United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960)).
176 See id.
167
168
169
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landlords nor a horizontal price-fixing restraint among the landlords themselves.1 7 7 The Court reasoned that the relationship
between the municipality and the landlords was not a section 1
combination because the landlords were forced to obey the
law.' 78 The majority also noted that while all the landlords
charged the same rent in compliance with the Ordinance, their
conduct did not establish a horizontal agreement since there was
"no meeting of the minds" to fix prices. 79 Since the landlords
did not have the freedom to resist the city's rent controls, the
Court concluded that the Berkeley Ordinance was a unilaterally
imposed restraint. 80 In dicta, the Court noted that not all governmental restraints necessarily amount to unilateral action
outside the purview of section 1.'81 Furthermore, the Court explained that certain restraints may be characterized as "hybrids"
in that private actors are given power by a state or local government to engage in illegal price-fixing practices. 8 2 Justice Marshall stated that, in the past, the Supreme Court has found such
183
hybrid restraints to violate the Sherman Act.
Having determined that the Berkeley Ordinance was unilaterally imposed, the Fisher Court held that it did not conflict with
the Sherman Act.' 8 4 Because the Court determined that the Ordinance was valid pursuant to the preemption analysis, the question of whether the Ordinance would be exempt under the Parker
177 See id. at 1049-50.

Id. at 1050.
Id.
180 Id. at 1051.
181 Id. at 1050-51.
182 Id. at 1050. The Court noted that although the Ordinance gave tenants, a
group of interested private parties, some power to enforce the provisions of the
Ordinance, it was insufficient to classify it as a hybrid restraint. Id. at 1051. In
deciding what constituted a hybrid restraint, the Court distinguished California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 444 U.S. 97 (1980) and
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) from Fisher.
Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1050-51.
183 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1051. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384 (1951); and supra notes 74-95 for a further analysis of this
proposition.
184 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1051. The Court acknowledged that in some instances a
state or local regulation may be a vehicle for disguising a private price-fixing arrangement. Id. Justice Marshall observed, however, that there was no indication
that such corruption had "tainted" the Berkeley Ordinance. Id. The fact that the
Ordinance was adopted by initiative and that it was being challenged by a group of
landlords convinced the Court that the Ordinance was not a "cloak for any conspiracy among the landlords or between the landlords and the municipality." Id.
178
179
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state action doctrine did not have to be addressed. 8 5
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell maintained that instead of applying preemption analysis, the majority should have
evaluated the Berkeley Ordinance under the well established
state action doctrine. 86 Referring to the Town of Hallie decision,
Justice Powell observed that a municipality claiming Parker protection need only demonstrate that the state expressly authorized
a municipality to act in such a manner which would foreseeably
18 7
result in anticompetitive effects.
Justice Powell began his analysis of the Ordinance by reviewing the legislative history of rent control in Berkeley.' 8 8 The concurrence noted that in 1972 the California Legislature ratified an
amendment to the city's charter authorizing city controlled rent
stabilization.' 8 9 The California Supreme Court, however, subsequently invalidated the amendment based on procedural
grounds.' 90 In 1980, the citizens of Berkeley adopted the rent
control Ordinance challenged in the case at bar.' 9 ' Notwithstanding the California Supreme Court's decision, Justice Powell
concluded that the state's ratification of the 1972 amendment satisfied the Lafayette "clearly articulated . . . state policy" requirement. 19 2 Accordingly, Justice Powell found that the Ordinance
was exempt from antitrust liability. 193
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's decision disregarded principles that had been evolving
for over forty years. 1 94 Justice Brennan maintained that the
Id. (relying on Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985)).
186 Id. at 1051 (Powell, J., concurring).
187 Id. at 1052 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1719).
185

188 See id.

Id.
190 Id. Justice Powell noted that in Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129,
550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976), the California Supreme Court invalidated the charter amendment because it "permitted individual adjustments of the
across-the-board rent ceiling only on a unit-by-unit basis, and only after a hearing
on the particular unit whose rent was to be raised." Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1052 n.2
(Powell, J., concurring).
191 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1052 (Powell, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 1053 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell rejected the landlords'
contention that the California Supreme Court's invalidation of the 1972 charter
amendment cancelled the legislature's ratification. Id. The state court invalidated
the amendment because it lacked procedural safeguards for the landlords; the court
never determined that rent control was bad policy or against state law. Id. Therefore, the state's ratification remained intact. Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority, Justice Brennan
viewed California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
189
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Berkeley rent control Ordinance effectively fixed prices and, as a
result, was preempted by the Sherman Act.' 95 In his view, the
majority failed to recognize the establishment of rent ceilings as
price fixing per se. 196 Justice Brennan also noted that by imposing rent controls, the city forced the landlords to abandon price
competition and to engage in horizontal price fixing.' 97 In addition to this horizontal restraint, Justice Brennan posited that the
Ordinance effectuated a vertical combination between the city
and the landlords because it compelled the landlords to fix
prices. 198 Moreover, the dissent concluded that, notwithstanding
the absence of any agreement, the Ordinance constituted a per se
violation of the Sherman Act since it was impossible to demonstrate that the city and landlords had acted independently.' 9 9
After concluding that the Ordinance irresistibly conflicted
with the Sherman Act, Justice Brennan analyzed the Ordinance
under the Parker state action doctrine.2 0 0 The Justice conceded
that the Supreme Court's prior holdings did not completely foreclose municipalities from enacting anticompetitive measures.201
The dissent observed, however, that a local government was accorded antitrust immunity only when it acted pursuant to express
97 (1980), and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951),
as being directly on point. See id. at 1055 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan acknowledged that the Berkeley landlords had no power to set their own
rent rates, whereas private parties in those other cases did. Id. Justice Brennan
contended, however, that this distinction was relevant only as to the state supervision criterion of the Lafayette two-prong test. Id.
195 See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1054 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan contended that the Berkeley Ordinance "irresistibly pressures landlords to fix prices
for their rental units. Thus, the Ordinance 'facially conflict[s] with the Sherman Act
because it mandate[s][price fixing,] an activity that has long been regarded as a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.' " Id. (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654, 659-60 (1982)) (emphasis in original).
196 Id. Justice Brennan commented that the Court's holding in Rice did not support the Fisher majority's narrow view of preemption. Id. Agreements to set prices
are per se illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act which because of their " 'pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.' " Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977) (quoting Northern Pac. R.R.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
197 Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1055 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying on Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951)).
198 Id. Justice Brennan noted that the majority failed to explain why the relationship between the landlords and the city was not a combination for section 1 purposes. Id.
199 See id. at 1055-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 1056 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
201 Id
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state authority and a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."' 20 2 Applying this standard to the Berkeley
Ordinance, Justice Brennan opined that the Ordinance did not
qualify for Parker protection. 20 3 In his view, California's ratification of the 1972 charter amendment was a pro forma approval of
Berkeley's rent control policy 20 4 and that such a general grant of
authority did not satisfy the Parker criteria.20 5
The Fisher majority opinion significantly alters the analysis of
municipal regulations under the antitrust laws. In the past, the
Supreme Court summarily noted or implied that an ordinance
conflicted with the Sherman Act before proceeding to the Parker
state action issue.2 0 6 The Fisherholding modified over forty years
of precedent by applying traditional antitrust principles to explicitly determine whether section 1 of the Sherman Act preempted
the Berkeley Ordinance. 20 7 As a threshold inquiry to the preemption issue, the Court required proof of concerted conduct
either among the landlords or between the landlords and the
2 8
city. 0
Prior to Fisher, the Court had never stipulated that concerted
action was a prerequisite to finding preemption. 20 9 A close examination of the Rice preemption standard, however, reveals that
concerted conduct is necessary to establish a conflict with the
Sherman Act. The Rice Court pronounced that in order for a
regulation to be facially preempted by section 1, it must constitute a per se violation. 210 Before it can be condemned as per se
illegal, however, the challenged regulation must fall within the
purview of section 1. On its face, section 1 extends exclusively to
coordinating activities between separate entities. 2 1 ' In order to
satisfy the concerted activity criterion, antitrust plaintiffs must
prove the existence of an agreement, contract, or combination
which tends to foreclose competition.21 2 The agreement may be
202 Id. (citing Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40, 52 (1982)).
203 Id. at 1057 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1056 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205 See id.
206 Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 661, 693 P.2d at 276, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
207 See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1053-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208 See id. at 1049.
209 Id. at 1054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982). See supra notes 147-58
and accompanying text for a discussion of Rice.
211 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
212 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984).
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expressed or implied. 21" The Court infers an agreement when
concerted action is contemplated by competitors and these parties, in turn, participate in a common arrangement.2 4 Absent
proof of a "meeting of the minds" by conspiracy or agreement,
the Court will not condemn independent conduct under section
1.215 Unilateral action, regardless of how detrimental to competition, is permitted.2 1 6 Only after the concerted conduct element
is satisfied, will the challenged regulation be scrutinized under
traditional antitrust standards to determine2 17if it authorizes or
mandates conduct that is a per se violation.
The Fisher Court correctly held that the conduct of the landlords and the city did not constitute concerted action for section
1 purposes. Admittedly, the conduct among the landlords resembles horizontal price fixing; that is, all competing property
owners in Berkeley abandon their independent pricing schemes
and charge identical rental rates. Although the landlords appear
to be conspiring to fix prices, their actions are not pursuant to an
expressed or tacit agreement. Each landlord sets his own rental
rates in accordance with the Berkeley Ordinance. Similarly, no
vertical conspiracy to eliminate price competition can be inferred
between the city and landlords. The city has established a rent
ceiling that compels landlords to abide by the specified rates.
213 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946). The
Court stated that:
No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy .... The essential combination of conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealing or other circumstances as
well as in an exchange of words. Where the circumstances are such as to
warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or
a common design and understanding or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement[,] the conclusion that a conspiracy is established is
justified.
Id. (citations omitted).
214 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948).
215 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
The Court has been reluctant to condemn the independent activities of a single
enterprise unless there is a threat of monopolization in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 767-68.
216 Id. at 768.
217 Arguably, rent control laws have adverse economic effects. Indeed, many
economists have condemned rent stabilization practices. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at
715-16, 693 P.2d at 316, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (Lucas,J., dissenting). For a discussion of the economic impact of rent control see M. LETr, RENT CONTROL: CONCEPTS, REALITIES, AND MECHANISMS 27-56 (1976).
The author notes several
disadvantages of rent control laws. Id. at 44. Despite these anticompetitive effects,
rent control laws cannot be per se violations of the Sherman Act unless the concerted action element is present. See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1051.
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The landlords have no choice but to obey the law. They are not
acquiescing to an agreement but, rather, are complying with the
law in order to avoid criminal penalties.
As a result of the Court's narrow application of the concerted action element, 21 8 municipalities are now granted broader
immunity from the antitrust laws than permitted in the recent
past. 2 " Local governments may now enact regulations with anticompetitive implications, whether instituted to benefit public
welfare or enhance parochial interests. 22 0 Indeed, municipal activities that were once deemed to conflict with the antitrust laws
will no longer be barred by section 1 of the Sherman Act. For
instance, municipalities will be able to unreservedly engage in
zoning, licensing, franchising, and transporting activities even if
such practices hinder or eliminate competition.2 21
Although the Court's holding immunizes many local regulations from the antitrust laws, courts are not precluded from finding preemption when conspiracies are blatantly present. Thus,
regulations that the Court characterizes as "hybrid" satisfy the
concerted conduct requirement since they grant private entities
the power to enforce agreements with third parties to restrict
trade.2 2 2 Preemption also ensues when a municipal price stabilization scheme is a shield for a private conspiracy to fix prices.2 2 3
Without the requisite concerted activity, a regulation will not
218 See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 14 (1982 Supp.) The author noted that:

Superficially, one might characterize any "meeting of the minds" as a
conspiracy. So broad a definition is both meaningless and inconsistent
with the Sherman Act, because it is grossly overinclusive for the purposes of antitrust law. When Supreme Court justices, legislators, city
council members, or zoning commissioners come to agreement within
their respective organizations, there is a meeting of the minds. However, no one would use the language of conspiracy, with its connotations
of impropriety, if not criminality, to describe the situation. Nor would
one say that a judge, commissioner, or other official who decides in
favor of party A rather than party B conspires with A, even if he adopted
all of A's arguments.
Id.
219 See Melton, The State Action Antitrust Defensefor Local Governments: A State Authorization Approach, 12 URBAN LAWYER 315, 318 (1980).

220 Ideally, a distinction should be made between the proprietary and governmental functions of a municipality. However, such a distinction would require an
inquiry as to the purpose for a specific enactment. This would entail a rule of reason analysis which is inappropriate under the Rice preemption standard.
221 See Melton, supra note 219, at 319-21 n.14. The commentator lists 10 categories of common municipal activities that, after City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), were deemed to have antitrust implications.
222 See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1050-51.
223 Id. at 1051.
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be preempted by section 1. If a challenged restraint is held to be
unilaterally imposed, a claimant must base his assertion on some
other provision of the antitrust laws. Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, for example, extends to both unilateral and concerted actions which "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize" a particular
economic market. 224 A monopolization allegation requires an inquiry as to the market power of the parties and their intent to
establish a monopoly. 225 Therefore, this assertion is unavailable
when a regulation is challenged in the abstract.2 26
Perhaps, the Fisher Court focused its analysis on the concerted action requirement because of the recent resurgence of
the Colgate doctrine. The Supreme Court's interpretation of concerted action has paralleled the development of municipal immunity. When Boulder and Lafayette were decided, the concerted
action criterion was significantly broadened to proscribe conduct
that was essentially independent. 227 By the time Fisher was decided, the Court had reinstated its commitment to a narrow view
of what constituted coordinating conduct. Accordingly, the
Fisher Court distinguished between concerted and independent
conduct and concluded that the Berkeley Ordinance neither
mandated nor authorized conduct proscribed by section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Thus, the Fisher holding is consistent with the
Court's construction of the concerted action requirement.
Moreover, the Court's decision is consistent with the recently enacted Local Government
Antitrust Act of
1984. 22 8Although Congress considered various proposals that
would have altered the analysis of municipal regulations, 229 it declined to interfere with the substantive evolving case law. In224 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.13
(1984).
225 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814-15 (1946).
226 See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1051 n.2.
227 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the majority's holding effectively overruled the
Colgate doctrine, which articulated that section 1 did not prohibit unilateral conduct. Id. at 49-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
228 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
229 The House Judiciary Committee actually considered three separate approaches that would have extended municipal immunity. See H.R. Rep. 965, 98th
Cong. & 2d Sess. 13-16, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4603.
One approach provided for "a legislative immunity for municipalities co-extensive
with that of States provided that local conduct is 'valid under State law' or that
'authority is vested' by the States for such conduct." Id. at 13. The second approach would have exempted the nonproprietary functions of a municipality. Id. at
15. The third and final approach would have established a rule of reason analysis
for municipal regulations. Id. at 16. The Committee rejected these proposals since
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stead, the Act exclusively concerns the issue of damages. In
passing this legislation, Congress created a deterrent to frivolous
2 30
antitrust suits and, in effect, increased municipal immunity.
Similarly, the Fisher Court's reliance on the concerted action requirement erects a barrier to antitrust challenges of purely regulatory schemes. Municipal conduct that is unilateral in nature
will not be preempted by section 1 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, there will be no need to determine whether the challenged
conduct is exempt from the antitrust laws. An analysis under the
state action doctrine will thus be circumvented, and municipalities will be free to enact economic regulations without the threat
of antitrust litigation.
Phyllis Gutto
they would have added confusion in the courts to the problems facing local governments. Id. at 13-16.
230 See H.R. REP. No. 965, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4603. The House Judiciary Committee Report noted that:
While this remedy approach does not create a new substantive test, it

does impose a substantial burden on plaintiffs at the outset of litigation.
Plaintiffs who fail to secure a preliminary injunction may have to weigh
carefully the costs of proceeding with the suit for a final disposition on
the merits. Thus, this proposal should work to deter frivolous suits and
to readjust the litigation advantages and disadvantages more equitably
for local government defendants.

